EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Prof. Nicholas Attamah

MANAGING EDITOR
Prof. Barnabas Nwankwo

AFRICAN UNION (AU) AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF DARFUR-SUDAN CRISIS, 2004-2020

Nwokoroeze Chinonye Nnenna
Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Enugu State University of Science and Technology, Enugu

Abstract

This study focused on the African Union and conflict resolution in Africa with particular reference to the Darfur conflict in Sudan. The Darfur conflict has become a global problem and a test-case for Africa Union's capacity in dealing with intractable conflicts in Africa. Two research questions were posed, to wit, what factors account for the nature and pattern of AU response to conflicts in Africa particularly to the crisis in Darfur region of South Sudan? And what indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution can the AU leverage on to respond to conflicts in Africa instead of relying on external forces? The objectives of the study include determining the factors that define the nature and pattern of the AU response; and determining what indigenous mechanisms the AU can rely on to solve conflict situations in the continent. The study is anchored on the social identity theory developed by Henri Tajfel. Two research hypotheses were posed. The study adopted the descriptive research design. It relied on secondary sources of data and data were collected from textbooks, journals, and the internet. We adopted content analysis as our method of analysis. Among the findings are that the AU response to the Darfur conflict has been greatly impacted by the differences between sub-Sahara and North African states, external pressures and the indictment of former President al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court greatly; and that the AU has the capacity and latitude to leverage on indigenous knowledge of African history to develop mechanisms of conflict resolution instead of relying on external prescriptions. It is this context that we recommended that the AU should be more assertive in its peacekeeping initiatives by critically reassessing its Afro-Arab relations and exploring ways of enhancing the partnerships. Secondly, it is recommended that the AU should consider the adoption of African traditional conflict resolution Mechanisms since the Western prescription, despite their laudable intentions have always resulted in conflict relapse.

Keywords: *conflict, conflict resolution, darfur conflict, global challenge, sub-sahara*

Introduction

That Africa has been enmeshed in intra and inter-groups conflicts in the past five decades is not in doubt. These conflicts have been triggered by several factors including ethnic and religious reasons, boundary disputes, poverty and bad governance bordering on corruption and lack of transparency. In other instances, the above factors have been escalated fundamentally by the nature and character of African states in relation to their colonial creation as nation-states. It is agreed among scholars that virtually all the African states are colonial creations. In creating such states, the colonial powers apparently ignored the peculiarities of independent ethnic states and merged most of them as one country. This pattern of state emergence in Africa has generated a climate of mutual suspicion and perpetual subversion among the disparate ethnic or religious groups, which colonialism unilaterally grouped together into one country.

The result has been strife and conflicts all over Africa; and specific instances of such strife and conflicts can be found in Zaire, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Liberia, Uganda, Angola, and Ethiopia etc. There is indeed no part of Africa that is not experiencing one form of crisis or the other. The Darfur crisis appears to be the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The Darfur region of Sudan, since 2003 has become what Ahmad (2009), referred to as "the site of terrible violence, death, and displacement". The United States of America has labeled what is happening in Darfur as 'genocide.' Despite the various interventions from within and outside Africa, the conflict has persisted and it is estimated that over five million Darfurians have either been displaced or killed (Human Rights Watch, 2006), comparable only to the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Evidently, the crisis situation in Darfur has attracted the attention of the international community as well as unprecedented media attention. While the international media may have sensationalized the Darfur tragedy, there have been little efforts to actually analyze the root causes of the crisis. Behind the tragic events in Darfur lies a complex history of deeply entrenched social inequalities, an environmental crisis and competition over natural resources, conflicting notions of identity, the militarization of rural societies, and, above all, a chronic problem of bad governance that has plagued the Sudan since its independence from British colonial rule in 1956. The essence of this study, therefore, is to examine the role of the African Union in conflict resolution in Africa with particular reference to the Darfur crisis in Sudan especially from 2004 to 2007.

Statement of the Problem

One of the primary reasons for establishing the African Union is to improve on the failures of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). For purposes of clarification, the AU came into existence in 2002 as a successor of the OAU, which was founded in 1963. It is also important to note here that the transition of the OAU to AU was not out of context with the paradigm shift that compelled the European Community to transform into the European Union (EU). From its inception in 1963, with 31 newly independent African countries, the OAU undertook the mandate for the promotion of unity and solidarity and ensure collective security on the continent. However, the OAU was burdened by its own internal contradiction despite its pan-Africanist credentials. These internal contradictions would in the long-run hamper its capability to resolve conflicts in most parts of the continent.

Without effective institutional structures and visionary leadership, the OUA's poor record on conflict resolution and management was compounded by financial, logistical, and political problems. Much of the OAU's failure was due to its policy of "non-interference" in states' internal affairs, which weakened its ability to prevent and manage conflicts, especially civil wars. Today, the successor AU has 53 independent African states as members. With the added features of intervention, independence, checks and balances, and monitoring, the AU seems to be potentially a 'more effective, democratic, and autonomous organization' (Zweifel 2006).

According to the former OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, the promise of the AU is its objectives of 'enhancing unity, strengthening co-operation and co-ordination as well as equipping the African continent with a legal and institutional framework, which would enable Africa to gain its rightful place in the community of nations' (Francis 2005). These hopeful objectives are rooted in a desire and motivation to 'enhance the cohesion, solidarity and integration of the countries and peoples of Africa' (Francis 2005). The core instrument for achieving the above objectives is the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The

Constitutive Act empowers states to intervene where countries fail to protect their citizens from internal conflicts. Specifically, Article 4(h) of the Principles provides: 'The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' (African Union 2000: Art 4(h).

This document, however, while reiterating the importance of promoting peace, security, and stability for individuals and the continent, also contains clauses, which affirm the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states exclusive of grave violations of human rights and goes so far as to prohibit the use of force or threat under the basis of non-interference (African Union 2000: Art 3,4). Despite these improvements, the AU has inherited many of the problems of its predecessor. Skeptics, thus, warn against prematurely assuming that the AU will 'significantly enhance the project of uniting Africa or strengthening the capacity of states to respond to peace and security issues on the continent' (Francis 2005). Perhaps, this fear is why the AU established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in the continent. As is profoundly evident in the case of ongoing massive slaughter and displacement of Darfur people of Southern Sudan or the alleged crimes against humanity, there is still the concern of how to mobilize and deploy collective resources in the continent for realizing the lofty goal of conflict prevention and management by the African Union.

Research Questions
In view of the foregoing, this study poses the following research questions:
   1. To what extent has the deployment of external recommendations by the AU to conflict resolution in Africa, especially in the crisis in Darfur region of Sudan, been effective?
   2. What indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution can the AU develop to respond to conflicts in Africa instead of relying on external forces?

Objectives of the Study
The general aim of this study is to examine the African Union in relation to its role in conflict resolutions with particular reference to the Darfur crisis in South Sudan from 2004 to 2020. From this general objective, the following specific objectives are outlined:
   1) To determine the extent to which the deployment of external prescriptions by the AU towards conflicts resolution in Africa, especially the conflict in Darfur region of Sudan, been effective.
   2) To determine if the AU can create an authentic African strategy in resolving conflicts on the continent instead of relying on external prescriptions for conflict resolution.

Significance of the Study
The significance of this study could be gleaned from its theoretical and empirical perspectives. Theoretically, the study is significant in the sense that it will add to the body of literature on AU and conflict resolution in Africa with special perspective on the Darfur crisis. In addition to this, the study adds to theory building through the provision of theoretical insights in understanding the dynamics of conflict resolution by regional bodies like the African Union. Empirically, the study is significant because it has provided strong evidence to show that there AU has made several attempts to resolving the Darfur conflict but has been constrained by institutional challenges. We are also convinced that the recommendations are useful to scholars and African leaders in redesigning strategies in the implementation of conflict resolution processes on the continent.

Scope of the Study
The scope of this study is limited to the examination of the African Union and conflict resolution in Africa with particular emphasis on the conflict in the Darfur region of Southern Sudan from 2004 to 2007.

The Concept of Conflict Resolution
According to Forsyth (2009), conflict resolution can be conceptualized as the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of conflict and retribution in such a way that group members of parties to the conflict commit to resolving such conflict by actively communicating information about their conflicting motives or ideologies to the other (e.g., intentions; reasons for holding certain beliefs) and by engaging in collective negotiation. Miller (2003), posits that conflict resolution is "a variety of approaches aimed at terminating conflicts through the constructive solving of problems, distinct from management or transformation of conflict".

Miall & Wood-House (2001), contend that by conflict resolution, it is expected that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved, and behaviour becomes neither violent nor attitude hostile any longer, while structure of the conflict becomes fundamentally changed. In the understanding of Mitchell & Banks (1996), conflict resolution implies that conflict is bad; hence it is something that should not be encouraged. It also assumes that conflict is a short term phenomenon that can be "resolved" permanently through mediation or other intervention processes. For Oguonu & Ezeibe (2014), conflict resolution is a more comprehensive approach based on mutual problem sharing between the conflicting parties. According to Sandole & van de Merwe, (1993), conflict resolution presupposes that deep-rooted causes of conflict are addressed so that the situation is no longer violent, hostile and exploitative. In the view of Cornelius & Faire (1989), conflict resolution elicits win-win solution and does not use coercion.

Mayer (2012), has argued that the way conflict is perceived and processed determines the type of resolution mechanism that could be employed is ending such conflict. The cognitive method, Mayer (2012), argues can be used in conflict resolution if we understand how parties to a conflict understand and view it in terms of their beliefs, perspectives, understandings and attitudes. Mayer also remarks that some social conflicts are anchored on emotions prompting parties to the conflict to expend so much emotional energy in pursuing their goals. In this type of conflict, Mayer argues, one can employ the strategy of emotional resolution. He however, notes that this type of resolution is best suited in intra-personal conflicts rather than on large social conflicts. There is also the behavioural mechanism of conflict resolution, which relates to how parties to conflict behave or act towards their opponents.

Thus, Rapoport (1989 and 1992), has noted that there is a wide range of methods and procedures for addressing conflicts such as negotiation, mediation, mediation-arbitration, diplomacy, and creative peacebuilding. According to Roberts & Ash (2009), the term conflict resolution may also be used interchangeably with dispute resolution, where arbitration and litigation processes are critically involved. The concept of conflict resolution can be thought to encompass the use of non-violent resistance measures by conflicted parties in an attempt to promote effective resolution. It is important to note here that although most scholars have tended to differentiate conflict resolution, conflict settlement and conflict management, this study uses these concepts interchangeably, essentially because whether it is management, settlement or resolution of conflict, the endpoint of these processes is to end conflict. Hence,

in this study, conflict resolution covers the whole gamut of processes (management, mediation, negotiation, etc) that are usually deployed in ending any conflict situation whether in the work place or in the larger society.

In the opinion of Oguonu & Ezeibe (2014), conflict management tends to focus more on mitigating or controlling the destructive consequences that emanate from a given conflict situation than on finding solution to the underlying issues causing the conflict. In the context of regional groupings like the AU, such conflict management process typically involves the use of military force for deterrence or peacekeeping (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). When we talk about conflict management, it is usually assumed that conflict is a long-term process which resolution may not be achieved immediately. In other words, the conflict has to be managed with tact and wisdom to avoid escalation so that in the final analysis it will be resolved. The notion of "management" suggests that people can be directed or controlled in order to reduce the volatility of the conflict than dealing with the real sources of the problem.

The foregoing informs Best (2005) assumption that "conflict management" is the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures; and by working with and through the parties involved in that conflict. He equally opines that the term is sometimes can also be referred to as "conflict regulation". By extension, the term covers other areas of handling "conflicts positively at different levels, including those efforts made to prevent conflict by being proactive" (Best, 2005). The concept equally includes such other terms like conflict limitation, containment and litigation. It may also include "conflict prevention". Burton (1990) uses this phrase 'conflict prevention' to connote "containment of conflict through steps introduced to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control the behaviour of conflict parties".

In summary, conflict management seeks, in the main, to indicate the fact that conflict is inevitable, and that not all conflicts are resolvable. Therefore, what those on mediation would do is to 'manage' and regulate them. Mediation, according to Udezo (2009), has been described as the voluntary, informal, non-binding process undertaken by an external party that fosters the settlement of differences or demands between directly interested parties. Miall et al (1999), support this description by seeing mediation as, "the intervention of a third party; it is a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), although it may include positive and negative inducements (mediation with muscle)".

Mediation, therefore, is understood and taken as assistance by a third party (mediator) where the parties to a conflict admit that they are both committed to solving, but in which the mediator manages a negotiation process, but does not impose a solution on the parties. It is purely a voluntary process. Mediation is a common skill that many people have, but which they hardly realize they do. Simply put, the role of a mediator is to create the enabling environment for the parties to carry out dialogue sessions leading to the resolution of a pending conflict Udezo, 2009).

Understanding African Perspective of Traditional Conflict Resolution
According to Ajayi (2014), before the advent of colonialism, traditional African communities had institutionalized codes or principles that guided conflict resolution. According to her, parties in disputes had confidence in the traditional structures and were ready to accept the verdict of such structures. These structures include the Council of Chiefs, the Chief Priests/Priestesses (otherwise called the mouth of the gods), and strong Secret Cults that

wield enormous power and influence in the communities. These structures, according to Ajayi (2014), existed in all traditional African communities, though under different names; and parties to a dispute were ever willing to submit themselves to the verdict of these constituted authorities. In an earlier work, Poku (1998), had observed that such disputes could be inter-personal or between communities and states; but irrespective of the level at which the dispute occurred, parties were always willing to make their cases before these traditional authorities.

Muigua (2017), has also supported the above view. According to him, long before the coming of the white men, African traditional communities had their own conflict resolution mechanisms, which were geared towards fostering peaceful co-existence among and between the Africans. Existence of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms such as negotiation, reconciliation, mediation and others is evidence that these concepts are not new in Africa (Brock-Utne 2001). They are practices that have been in application in Africa for a long period. Conflict resolution among the traditional African people was anchored on the ability of the people to negotiate. However, with the arrival of the colonialists; Western notions of justice such as the application of the common law of England were introduced. The common law brought the court system, which, being adversarial, greatly eroded the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. A misconception of the African communal way of life, conflict resolution institutions and prejudice against their traditional way of life saw the Europeans introduce the western ideals of justice which were not based on political negotiations and reconciliation.

In the opinion of Bello & Olutola (2016), traditional conflict resolution mechanism in Africa is as old as human settlement on the continent. These traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are predicated on the people's customs and traditions. According to Bello & Olutola (2016), the beauty of these traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is that they dig deep to unearth the core issues at stake or the underlying causes of the conflict; resolve them and "help to heal and restore broken relationships". These mechanisms, argued Bello & Olutola (2016), constitute a sharp departure from the concept of justice introduced by Western civilization in African communities. It has been argued also that the European idea of justice is fundamentally an "adversarial contention of evidence with the aim of ascertaining the guilty and the guiltless, thereby punishing the guilty. Whereas the African approach implored the guilty to confess in order to start a healing process of reconciliation (Tutu, 1999; Fred-Mensah, 2008). The importance of these traditional African models, according to Cloudree (1999), is that whereas the European models emphasize punishment for the guilty, the African models emphasize confession of guilt by the guilty so that peace can be restored and the healing process initiated.

The African models, according to Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo (2000), focuses on the brotherhood of mankind where the guilty should be courageous to own up his guilt and confess before the gods to avoid generational consequences. The African belief in the potency of the gods and the tragedy that may follow is deeply-rooted; and this is why it is very effective. Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo (2000), remarked that such African models are usually employed in informal social-cultural settings, either between individuals or states; and such models involve values, beliefs, attitudes and even suspicions. In doing this, Brock-Utne (2001), argues that the underlying causes of conflict must be unraveled to portray common understanding of the past and present; re-build broken relationships, correct wrongs and restore justice. The objective of indigenous models of conflict resolution in Africa is not

necessarily to accuse or punish offenders, but to settle disputes, heal wounded hearts and reach a compromise that may assist to improve future relationship (Brock-Utne 2001).

Why Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms Proved Effective in Pre-colonial Africa

There is unanimity of opinion among African scholars that African traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were very effective before the coming of colonialism; and many factors account for this effectiveness. Scholars like Muigua (2017), Murithi (2006), Bamikole (2012), Mkangi (2012) and Agulanna (2009) have at different times argued that such factors like the African belief in their common humanity, the cultivation of the spirit of "live-and-let-live" or what Muigua (2017) referred to as the "principle of reciprocity" as well as mutual respect for one another provided the ground for the application of our traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

For instance, Africans generally see themselves as one people, i.e. before the balkanization of Africa and introduction of artificial boundaries by the colonial powers. The extended family system was instrumental to this feeling of oneness; and this is the reason why divisions among members of the community were not encouraged. Muigua (2017), has tried to explain this concept of oneness among the Africans through the Swahili philosophy of "*ubuntu*" or "*utu*", which means "one humanity". Among the Igbo of Nigeria, one can always hear them say: "We are one people; we are all Igbo; and we are all one community".

This type of understanding about common humanity among the various peoples of Africa has created significant bond between individuals and communities making it difficult for the other to contemplate violence. Relying on the above assumption, Murithi (2006), asserts that "**p**eaceful coexistence was emphasized and conflicts in African traditional society were seen as a threat to the existence of the society itself". In essence, argued Bamikole (2012), traditional African society underscored corporate or communal interests as opposed to selfish ambitions or individualistic pursuits. Individualistic ideals were introduced into the African people by the Europeans in propagating the capitalist ideology (Bamikole, 2012).

Mkangi, (2012); and Ezenweke & Nwadialor, (2013), have also argued that this principle of "common humanity" among Africans "stressed the central value that, despite cultural and ethnic differences, human beings are basically the same and hence the African communal way of life". By living in a communal setting, there was acceptance that every member of the community was entitled to access natural resources, with the result that this principle formed an integral aspect in resolving conflicts involving natural resources such as land Mkangi, 2012). Muigua (2017), reported the interview he conducted in the Maasai region of Kenya wherein it suggested by the respondents that before the introduction of colonial system of government in Kenya, "there were few environmental conflicts among the Maasai community because land, forest and water resources in the olden days were communally owned. The grazing lands, watering points, hunting grounds and the forests were accessed equally by the members of the particular clans that possessed them. Thus, the scarcity or abundance of a resource was never a source of conflict as such".

The second factor that created a fertile ground for conflict resolution in Africa was the principle of accommodation and reciprocity. Hughes (2011), has noted that in the traditional African society there were "mutual exchange of privileges, goods, favours, obligations, among others", which fostered peaceful coexistence and consequently eliminated the likelihood of wars and conflicts. If a community was facing a calamity, say famine or death of livestock, other communities would come to the aid of that particular community (Hughes, 2011). This type of existence nurtured a culture of communal life, which fostered peaceful

relationships. This type of existence existed among the Agikuyu ethnic group in Kenya; among the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria; and other African traditional societies. This principle emphasized a sense of collective security through a social set up, which supported an egalitarian social living. Among the several African communities, it is believed that if you assist your neighbour; that neighbour would reciprocate in future.

In addition to the foregoing, there was also the deep attachment to core traditional family values by Africans. One of such core traditional family values in Africa, according to Acquah (2011), is respect towards parents, elders, ancestors and the environment. This value was cherished and well-entrenched in the customs, traditions and taboos. Strong traditions, customs and norms fostered respect and wayward members of the community faced disastrous consequences, such as the imposition of fines and other penalties. This way, religion played a central role in shunning conflict-causing conduct. Respect was codified in taboos and the concept of social distance which regulated "what one could do, whom to talk to and how to relate to one another according to one's sex, age and status." In this way, social conflicts were avoided and resolved through respect that people had for one another, parents, elders, the ancestors and even to the environment (Mkangi, 2012).

Examples of Traditional Institutions of Conflict Management
According to Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo (2012), Muli (2006), Rabar & Karimi (2004) and Murithi (2006), there are several traditional institutions for conflict resolution in Africa such as the family institution, Village assembly of the community, Age grade systems, Council of elders, women groups (such as Umuada in Igbo culture), Secret cults and masquerade cults. These systems have worked well in most African societies. For instance, among the Igbo ethnic group of Nigeria, the family is the smallest social institution and the first point of socialization. Osei-Hwedie & Rankopo (2012), have remarked that the family is a major institution in conflict management. In a general sense, the family consists of the man and his wife or wives, and the children. But in Africa, this definition of the family has limiting connotations. The Africans maintain an extended family system which admits people beyond the nuclear family. Among many African societies like the Igbo of Nigeria, Pokot and Turkana of Kenya, the extended family is the first institution of conflict management and resolution.

As Muli (2006), remarked, a dispute that cannot be resolved in the immediate family is taken to the extended family or what the Igbo call the "Umunna". If any party to a dispute is dissatisfied with the verdict of the family or extended family, the party can appeal to the Council of Elders or the Village Assembly, which is the highest decision-making organ of the community. This Assembly has enormous powers including the power to declare war or call for truce or negotiations. The Council of Elders in Igboland, according to Ezeogidi (2019), is a veritable structure for conflict management. When a case is brought before the Council of Elders, each disputant is allowed to address the Council on the matter. After addressing the Council, the disputants are asked to withdraw from the venue and come back on an appointed time. At the withdrawal, the Council would demand for inputs from members. At the end of inputs from members, a unanimous resolution or judgment is agreed upon. On the appointed time, the judgment is pronounced to the disputants and blames and penalties are apportioned. This is done after each side of the case has been thoroughly examined.

This system has been employed in conflict resolution in other African societies such as the Pokot and Turkana ethnic groups in Kenya. Similar structures like the Gracaca and Mato-oput have been deployed for effective conflict resolution in Rwanda and Uganda

respectively. Wahab (2018), has also studied the Judiyya system in Darfur region of Sudan. Among the various groups in Sudan, including Darfur, the judiyya system represents an indigenous model of conflict resolution. This system is closely embedded in deep-seated cultural facts; and the elders play significant roles in managing and resolving conflicts. We shall examine this model in detail in section four of this study.

Understanding the Context of the Darfur Conflict

According to Hassan (2010), the conflict, which has engulfed Darfur since 2003 is representative of a complex and multi-layered situation, whose internal and external dimensions are too intertwined to respond to the tools of standard analysis? Western discourse, asserts Hassan (2010), promotes a collection of myths and claims that fail the test of reality. It encourages theories such as ethnic cleansing, forced migration and racial divisions between Arabs and Africans, which is a form of propaganda warfare in all its forms and shapes (Flint & de Waal, 2005). That ideological turn, loaded with the intellectual and mythical bias, which entered the world after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, unjustifiably pushed the world community to adopt particular stances and policies that have impeded the process of serious negotiations about Darfur.

According to O'Fahey (2008), the name *Darfur* in Arabic means "the land of the Fur". Historically, it was an Islamic sultanate located in the western Sudan. The Fur were the ruling ethnic group in the Darfur region before1916. The Fur began to be converted to Islam in the 1300s. In 1596AD, the Darfur Sultanate was established with Islam declared as the state religion. The Darfur sultanate remained independent through various conflicts in the Sudan, including the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan in1898, before finally being subjugated by the British in 1916and made part of western Sudan (O'Fahey, 2008). Darfur's long history of independence, and its resistance to various other groups seeking control of all of Sudan, should be taken into consideration to properly understand the present situation.

Hoile (2005) avers that Darfur is home to some 80 tribes and ethnic groups divided between nomads and sedentary communities. The rebels, Hoile (2005) maintains, seem to be drawn from within mainly three communities of the Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa tribes. The war has inevitably focused upon those areas of Darfur within which the insurgents chose to base themselves. As has been the case in countless wars, many civilians have chosen to flee and remove themselves from these war zones. Although the indigenous peoples of Darfur (the Fur, and several other ethnic groups) and the Arabs have relatively distinct identities, they generally got along well until resources became scarce, then ethnicity and race became a factor in the conflict (Cobham, 2005).

Hassan (2010) argues that Darfur has historically been one of the most remote regions of Sudan. Even in normal circumstances, the region is hard to reach because it is so far from the capital, Khartoum. Tribal and ethnic conflicts are neither new nor uncommon. Incidents of both small and large scale conflicts are recorded as far back as 1939 and they generally arise from disputes over access to natural resources like range lands and water points as well as livestock trespassing (grazing on farm lands), closure of herd routes and cattle raiding. Larger conflicts normally emerge from tribal disputes, banditry and disputes with transnational migrating communities. The influx of modern small arms since the war in Chad has increased the loss of life during such conflicts and caused polarization on ethnic lines. Historically, North Darfur and parts of West and South Darfur have suffered recurrent droughts. Crop yields have remained low and unpredictable due to erratic rainfall, pest infestation and the lack of agricultural inputs. Livestock has also dwindled due to pasture and water scarcity. The

local labour force has continued to migrate in search of employment leaving behind children, women and the elderly. A combination of these factors over several years has systematically eroded the coping capacities of communities (Hoile, 2005).

The pattern of conflict changed from low-intensity, small-scale outbreaks from the1950s to the1970s, to high-intensity, persistent and large-scale battles in the mid-1980s. According to O'Fahey (2008), these conflicts have included those between the Rezegat and Maaleya (1968), Salamat and Taayesha (1980), Binihelba and Meharya (1980), Zaghawa and Gamar (1989). The prolonged drought that began in 1983 drove nomadic Zaghawa and Arab groups southwards into the central Fur region of Jebel Marra. By the time of the 1989 peace conference, several thousand tribesmen had died, tens of thousands had been displaced and about 40,000 homes destroyed (O'Fahey, 2008). These conflicts have been between nomadic and sedentary communities, and amongst and within nomadic and pastoralists.

There has also been an additional source of instability in Darfur. Although the ethnically diverse people of Darfur were all Muslims and have a very strong sense of belonging to the Sudan, a sizeable minority also feel affinity with related groups in neighboring Chad. According to Hoile (2005), in early 2003, two armed groups waged war in Darfur against the Government of Sudan. These groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began the war with attacks on towns, government facilities and civilians in Darfur. Several hundred policemen were murdered and more than eighty police stations were destroyed in attacks. This resulted in a security vacuum which further distorted civil society in Darfur with numerous communities responding in their own ways. The conflict subsequently spiraled out of control and has resulted in many deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Sudan. Many others have fled into neighboring Chad. A growing humanitarian crisis ensued.

The rebel movements in Darfur, contends Cobham (2005), have claimed that they are fighting against underdevelopment and marginalization. Every part of Sudan, north, south, east and west is underdeveloped and Darfur has been the focus of considerable government attention. These claims should be better understood in terms of the nature of political participation, with the government in Sudan trying to introduce a federal model of government. Other sectors like education, healthcare delivery, water and power supplies as well as transport infrastructure in Darfur have received attention from the government. The conflict in Darfur presents a very complex situation with very complex problems, and understanding of which has already been made more difficult by the propaganda, which invariably accompanies war. The region is home to some 80 tribes and ethnic groups divided between nomads and sedentary communities. The rebels appear to have been identified within two or three communities of the Fur, Massalit and the Zaghawa tribes which straddle the Sudan-Chad border. There are many dimensions to the conflict- regional, national and international.

But, environmental factors such as encroaching desertification have led to considerable tension between nomads and more established farming communities. The inter-tribal violence that has taken place in Darfur has, nevertheless, been portrayed by some anti-government activists and some international media and NGOs as "ethnic cleansing" and even "genocide". The activities of nomadic Arab tribesmen known as the "Janjaweed" have come into sharp focus. It is claimed that they are sponsored by the Government. It is unclear exactly how much control anyone has over the "Janjaweed" gunmen, except their tribal leaders (Hoile, 2005).

All wars lead to human rights violations. The conflict in Darfur has been no exception. And as is so often the case in war, the conflict has inevitably been caught up in the propaganda and misinformation that comes with it and that has certainly characterized previous coverage of Sudan. In its wake, efforts at conflict resolution will be hampered and the palpable presence of ethnic hostility will indeed constitute a concrete and tangible cause of future violent confrontations; and this is the challenge that the AU must deal with (Hassan, 2010).

The African Union (AU): An Overview
The African Union, contends Asogwa (2013), originated from the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa by 32 independent African states. Asogwa (2013), further observed that despite its lofty aspirations and the fire of Pan-Africanism, the OAU became a constant victim of various crises that threatened its very foundation and thus failed to deliver on its promises. It will be recalled that one of the major aims of the organization was to promote sustainable African development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies. Unfortunately, the OAU failed to live up to expectation (Meredith, 1984; Murithi, 2005). In the opinion of Asogwa (2013), the major failure of the OAU was its inability to drive regional integration; maintain peace and ensure security and political stability on the continent.

Thus, by September 1999, African leaders had come to the conclusion that the OAU as then structured was incapable of meeting the challenges of continental development and integration in a multi-polar world and therefore resolved to create a new continental body that would meet its needs. Thus was born the African Union (AU), a pan-African organization whose goal is to propel a united continent towards peace and prosperityThe AU, according to Salim (2001), seeks to address the many challenges confronting Africa through the broad framework of NEPAD.   The establishing instrument of the AU is significantly different from the Charter of the OAU in that it laid strong emphasis on democracy, rule of law, good governance; promotion of social justice and gender equality as well as balanced economic development. The Constitutive Act of the AU retained some salient features of the OAU Charter such as the principle of non-interference but provided a *caveat* to encourage such intervention. For example, items (h) and (j) of Article 4 of the Constitutive Act upholds the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; and also the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security. The Constitutive Act of the AU expanded the scope and mandate of the Union and consequently established about nine organs as against four established by the defunct OAU.

AU Intervention in Darfur
Prior to the emergence of the AU, the predecessor, OAU, could not intervene in the Darfur crisis because of the principle of non-interference in its charter (Ikunyua, 2010). It was, therefore, the transformed AU, which had discarded the principle of non-interference that saw and appreciated the human tragedy that the Darfur crisis had become and resolved to get involved. Lacking sufficient political will to intervene more directly, the international community decided to delegate responsibility for Darfur to the African Union, in what Chin and Morgenstein (2005) termed an "African solution to an African problem". This was the background under which the African Union was given the responsibility for overseeing the peace negotiations already going on in Sudan; and for deploying an intervention force on the

ground. Chin and Morgenstein (2005), agree that the peace efforts yielded result because on April 8, 2004 the Sudanese Government, SLA and JEM signed a ceasefire agreement and a month later a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) was established to monitor the ceasefire.

It was based on the foregoing that the AU in its 10th meeting of July 27th 2004, through its Peace and Security Council (PSC) discussed Darfur; and thereupon requested its Chairperson to prepare a plan for making the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) more effective. It emphasized the importance of disarming and neutralizing the Janjaweed militias, protecting civilians, and facilitating humanitarian assistance, and raising the possibility of an AU peacekeeping mission (AU, 2004). Although PSC decisions are legally binding on AU members, the organization soon realized that at least a tacit cooperation with the Sudan government was needed for successful deployment. The implication of this tacit agreement, noted ICG (2005), was the limiting of the scope of Union's activities to those areas acceptable to the government. As a result, the PSC retreated from its initial concept and on 20 October 2004 decided that the Mission mandate should be to monitor compliance with the 8 April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent agreements and assist in confidence-building amongst others.

Irrespective of the several gains score by the AU in Darfur, experts are of the opinion that the AMIS was incapable of delivering on its mandate for several reasons. In many parts of South Sudan violence has broken out between rival groups. According to the ICG (2005), the observed limitations are partially a consequence of AU inexperience in peacekeeping and the nascent stage of its PSC mechanisms, particularly in mission management and force generation. But beyond these institutional problems, the AU military operations in Darfur faced constraints that would hamstring even the most experienced peacekeeping force: an inadequate mandate, insufficient forces and capabilities, and political failure to acknowledge that the Sudanese government has consistently failed to meet its responsibilities to neutralize the militias and protect its citizens (ICG, 2005).

Gap in Literature
That Africans place much on the capacity of the AU to resolve the various conflicts plaguing the continent is not in doubt. So much has been written concerning the AU and conflict resolution in Africa but it would appear that majority of these writings are from outside Africa with few African scholars lending their voices. AU conflict resolution mechanisms have always been developed outside the continent and we merely adopt them without local input.

Apart from the several factors identified in literatures regarding the limitations of the AU and its conflict resolution strategies, one noticeable gap in the literature is the paucity of African grown strategies. Before colonial contact, Africans have internal mechanisms for conflict resolution. For instance, among the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria the institutions of the extended family, Village Assembly, Council of Elders and even secret cults were used for conflict management and resolution. Among the Rwanda people the traditional system of *Gacacia* was used in conflict resolution; the *mato-oput* was used in Uganda while in Darfur, the *judiyya* traditional system was deployed. Each of these traditional mechanisms proved effective in conflict resolution in the societies where they were employed. The aim of this study, therefore, is to highlight the relevance of these traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in addressing the Darfur conflict, which many scholars have ignored.

Theoretical Framework
This study is anchored on the Social Identity Theory (SIT), which was propounded by the Social Psychologists, Henri Tajfel and John Turner in the 1970s. This theory describes the conditions under which social identity becomes more important than one's identity as an individual. The theory also specifies the ways in which social identity can influence intergroup behaviour. It describes the cognitive processes related to social identity and how social identity impacts intergroup behaviour.

Social identity theory is built on three key cognitive components namely: social categorization, social identification, and social comparison. Generally, individuals wish to maintain a positive social identity by maintaining their group's favourable social standing over that of relevant out-groups. In-group favouritism can result in negative and discriminatory outcomes, but research demonstrates that in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination are distinct phenomena, and one does not necessarily predict the other. Social identity theory specifies three mental processes individuals go through to make in-group or out-group classifications.

The first process, *social categorization*, is the process by which we organize individuals into social groups in order to understand our social world. This process enables us to define people, including ourselves, on the basis of the groups to which we belong. We tend to define people based on their social categories more often than their individual characteristics. Social categorization generally results in an emphasis on the similarities of people in the same group and the differences between people in separate groups. One can belong to a variety of social categories, but different categories will be more or less important depending on social circumstances.

The second process, *social identification*, is the process of identifying as a group member. Socially identifying with a group leads individuals to behave in the way that they believe members of that group should behave. Through this process, people become emotionally invested in their group memberships. Consequently, their self-esteem is impacted by the status of their groups.

The third process, *social comparison*, is the process by which people compare their group with other groups in terms of prestige and social standing. In order to maintain self-esteem, one must perceive his or her in-group as having a higher social standing than an out-group.

In-group favouritism and out-group discrimination are often viewed as two sides of the same coin. However, research has shown that this is not necessarily the case. There is not a systematic relationship between the positive perception of one's in-group and the negative perception of out-groups. Helping in-group members while withholding such help from out-group members differs significantly from actively working to harm out-group members.
In-group favouritism can result in negative outcomes, from prejudice and stereotypes to institutional racism and marginalization. However, such favouritism does not always lead to hostility towards out-groups. Research demonstrates that in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination are distinct phenomena, and one does not necessarily predict the other (Brewer, 2010).

Applicability and Relevance of the theory to the Study
A befitting framework for understanding the Darfur conflict is the social identity theory; and there are reasons for adopting this theoretical framework. First is that the complex history of

identity formation in Darfur, which provides rich material for the creation of new ethnic identities. Secondly, internal polarization began with some of Darfur's Arabs. Exposed to the Islamist-Arabism of Sudan, drawing upon the Arab lineage ideology, the Arabs in Darfur have adopted an Arab supremacist ideology. In the real sense we can better understand the Darfur conflict from the prism of social identity, which has pitted various groups against each other as "us" and "them".

Hypotheses
1) The implementation of external solutions by the AU to the Darfur conflict and other conflicts in Africa has been very ineffective

2) The AU have ignored traditional African conflict resolution mechanisms in preference for external prescriptions

Research Design
We adopted the case study variant of the descriptive research design for this study. This research design is useful in describing the characteristics of a population. In this study, we are concerned with the Darfur region of Sudan. This type of research design helped the researcher in collecting data that were used in answering the research questions posed; bearing in mind that the main aim of any research is to understand and answer the research problems. The descriptive research design helped us in answering the questions of what is happening in Darfur, why is it happening, how is to happening, where and when it happened. Descriptive Research Design helps a researcher gain a deeper knowledge of the research problem.

Methods of Data Collection
We adopted the method of secondary sources of data generated journals and books, Internet materials and official publications of the African Union and its agencies and those of other relevant multilateral institutions involved in resolving the Darfur conflict such as the United Nations and the European Union. This study relied extensively on secondary sources of data

Method of Data Analysis
In the study, we adopted the qualitative descriptive method in analyzing our data. Qualitative descriptive analysis essentially has to do with summarizing the information generated in a research, so that appropriate analytical methods could be used to further discover relationship among the variables. The adoption of the foregoing analytical method was necessary because the study principally relied on secondary sources of data.

EXTENT OF AU'S RESPONSE TO THE DARFUR CONFLICT
AU's Political Strategy of Response to the Darfur Crisis
It has been argued by Bah (2010), that the pattern and nature of AU's intervention in the Darfur conflict was defined by so many factors. These factors revolve around deficit political strategies by the AU, conflict of interests between countries in the sub-Sahara and North Africa regarding resolutions on Darfur and most importantly the response that attended the indictment of former President al-Bashir of Sudan by the International Criminal Court on war crimes.

In concrete terms, this section of the study explored the complexities surrounding the AU's response against the backdrop of a regional approach to what had fundamentally become an international problem. According to Bah (2010), the Darfur crisis was internationalized

because of vocal advocacy by civil society and human rights groups, and allegations of war crimes and genocide, warranting an international response. The analyses in this section focuses on how the AU's political strategy of pursuing dialogue between the parties was contradicted and undermined by the policies of some of its members, especially from North Africa, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Although divisions between Arab and sub-Saharan members of the AU were less evident in the debates and voting patterns in the Peace and Security Council (PSC), they made themselves felt in the UN Security Council (UNSC), where Arab members of the Council particularly Qatar and Algeria, either voted against actions directed at the Government of Sudan or, at best, abstained. The voting patterns and policy positions of North African members of the AU in the UNSC failed to complement its peacemaking venture in Darfur. Emboldened by the support of these countries, the government of Sudan failed to cooperate with the AU by obstructing the operations of its peacekeeping mission, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) despite having consented to its deployment. Furthermore, the AU's efforts faltered due to the deteriorating political, humanitarian and security environment in Darfur, exacerbated by splintering within the armed groups and a wavering commitment to a negotiated settlement on all sides.

Even when the whole world had interpreted what is going on in Darfur as genocide, the AU has been reluctant to describe the situation in Darfur as genocide. As the conflict between Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) raged on for over two decades, long-standing tensions in Darfur were neglected. Meanwhile, negotiations led by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, marking the end of Africa's longest running civil war; a conflict that had claimed the lives of approximately two million people and displaced millions more (Bah, 2010).

However, the marginalization of Darfur meant that the celebrations marking the end of the north-south conflict were short-lived, as news of mass murder involving government soldiers and their infamous militia allies, the *Janjaweed*, eclipsed the much-celebrated deal. In Darfur, the Government and *Janjaweed* were pitted against the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the two groups that had taken up arms against the Islamist government in early 2003. As international media attention began to turn to Darfur, the gravity of the situation, with its scenes of death and destruction, was revealed to the world. Images of violence evoked memories of earlier atrocities, most notably the Rwandan genocide, leading to calls for intervention to avert a repeat of that tragedy. These calls gained momentum when former President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell described the conflict as genocide.

Meanwhile, peace talks continued apace under the auspices of the AU, culminating two years later in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA led by Mini Minnawi. Signed on 6 May, 2006, the DPA faced serious challenges from its inception primarily because it was a partial agreement that did not enjoy the support of the two other parties in the conflict - the JEM and the other SPLA faction led my Abdoul Wahid. The DPA was further undermined by the divisions among the armed groups along ethnic lines, pitting the Zaghawa against others most notably, the Fur, the largest ethnic group in Darfur. This rift led to increased friction among the armed groups and their civilian sympathizers in the internally displaced persons' camps, and indeed it continued to hinder efforts to reach a political settlement.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)

Despite its flaws, the DPA attempted to address the contentious issues of security, power and wealth-sharing, but it failed as it was rejected by two key faction leaders and their followers in Darfur. Unsurprisingly, the post-DPA period witnessed an increased splintering of the rebel groups leading to the emergence of various armed factions with no clear political agenda, further complicating the situation. From the outset, implementation of the DPA proved to be a difficult challenge for the AU, especially as the non-signatories viewed the Union as biased due to its role in negotiating the agreement. This resulted in a marked increase in hostile action towards AMIS, hindering its activities. However, targeted attacks on the peacekeepers manifested a wider deterioration of security due to the weakening of the command and control structures of the rebel groups as a result of their fragmentation.

The renewed fighting exacerbated the dire humanitarian situation. Despite these challenges, the AU established the DPA Implementation Team (DPA-IT) with a mandate to spearhead implementation of the agreement. The DPA-IT was to work closely with the Chairperson of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) Team. The DDDC Team, modeled on the *Loya Jirga* in Afghanistan, was to address issues ranging from security, claims of marginalization and exclusion and socio-economic development to reconciliation. The *Loya Jirga,* or traditional Afghan Grand Council, was to elect a Head of State for Afghanistan's Transitional Administration, and propose its structure and key personnel. It was envisaged as a bottom-up approach to remedy some of the anomalies that resulted from the top-down approach of the Abuja peace process. The central aim was to increase the local population's sense of ownership of the peace process, thereby legitimizing it. Moreover, it was meant to encourage dialogue between the people of Darfur. But, since the vast majority of the people had already rejected the DPA, efforts to convene the DDDC were obstructed, undercutting the bottom-up peacemaking approach that had been envisaged.

For its part, the PSC endorsed the DPA and set a deadline for the non-signatories to sign up or face sanctions (*Communiqué of 51ˢᵗ meeting of PSC/MIN.Comm/1, May, 2006*). Unsurprisingly, these groups failed to comply, forcing the PSC to impose targeted sanctions including a travel ban and asset freeze of the leadership of the factions who were now viewed as spoilers (*Communiqué of the 58ᵗʰ meeting of the PSC/MIN/Comm (LVIII), June, 2006*). But the sanctions were largely symbolic since the AU lacked the leverage and mechanism to enforce them. Additionally, the move put the AU at loggerheads with the affected groups, who were already skeptical about its role. Consequently, disagreements about the DPA weakened the AU's mediation efforts, plunging the entire peace process into disarray.

Meanwhile, the inter-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja that culminated in the DPA were plagued by differences between the AU and UN, the other partner in the peace process. These differences were not helped by the personality clashes between the two leading mediators, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Pronk of the AU and UN respectively (Bah, 2010). While the UN favoured a step-by-step approach, the AU aimed for a comprehensive agreement because the parties had signed earlier agreements, which in its view, was already the basis for a final settlement. While these differences were minor, the mediation efforts faltered due to what some have described as deadline diplomacy and a lack of commitment from the parties.

There was undue emphasis throughout the talks in concluding negotiations even after the parties had repeatedly demonstrated a lukewarm commitment to the peace process and the will to implement any subsequent agreement. This situation was summed up by the head of the AU mediation team Sam Ibok, when he stated that '…our experience over the past sixteen

months has led us to conclude that there is neither good faith nor commitment on the part of any of the parties' (de-Waal, 2007). Nonetheless, the pressure to conclude the negotiations was intense due to a combination of factors. The donors, most notably, the United States, Britain, Canada and the EU, who funded the talks, repeatedly threatened to withhold their financial support if the parties failed to reach an agreement. These donors and the UN believed that signing an agreement would pave the way for a transition from the under-resourced AMIS to a more comprehensive UN peace operation.

This logic was flawed, because even after the DPA, the Government of Sudan refused to consent to the transition. The Government of Sudan's intransigence over the transition, coupled with the anti-DPA propaganda by the non-signatories, exposed the weakness of 'deadline diplomacy' (de-Waal, 2007).

The Emergence of AU-UN Hybrid Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur
The growing insecurity and additional tasks included in the mandate of the DPA served as strong arguments for a transition from AMIS to a UN force. The under-resourced AU peacekeepers had proved incapable of addressing the mounting security problems. Consequently, the PSC decided on a '…transition from AMIS to a UN operation, within the framework of the partnership between the AU and the United Nations' (*Communiqué of the 45th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia PSC/PR/Comm. (XLV), 12 January 2006*). However, it stressed that this transition should take place only with the consent of the Government of Sudan and on the understanding that the African Character of the UN-Mission would be maintained, including its composition and leadership (*Communiqué of the 46th Meeting Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, PSC/MIN/Comm. (XLVI), 10 March 2006*).

If these caveats were meant to appease the Government of Sudan, they did not; President Bashir rejected the proposal, arguing that the AU lacked the mandate to handover its mission to another organization. Disagreements over the proposed transition proved to be a major sticking point, highlighting the challenges facing the AU in bringing round intransigent members. For its part, the UNSC welcomed the PSC's decision and requested that the Secretary-General draw up contingency plans to explore options for a handover to the UN (*Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2006/05, 3 February, 2006*). During this period, the UNSC visited Sudan and Chad with the aim of boosting the DPA and paving the way for the proposed transition.

The Council held high-level consultation meetings with members of the Government of National Unity, including President al-Bashir. It also met with the senior leadership of the AU and AMIS and held its first joint session with the PSC in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Despite their efforts, President al-Bashir reiterated his objection, particularly to the deployment of a UN Mission under Chapter VII, which in his view would have amounted to the re-colonization of Sudan. He cited Resolution 1679 (2006), adopted under Chapter VII, as an example of bad faith by the international community. Nonetheless, the UNSC outlined a seven-stage process that would culminate in the deployment of UN blue helmets (*Report of the Security Council Mission to the Sudan and Chad, S/2006/433, 4-10 June 2006*). The plan included the provision of additional resources to AMIS to ensure that there was no gap during the transition period.

Resolution 1706 and the Afro-Arab Vote
As the debate on the transition of the AMIS to UN Peacekeeping force continued, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706 on August 31st 2006; expanding the mandate of

the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) to include deployments in Darfur. Twelve members of the Council, including the African member states, Ghana, which co-sponsored the Resolution along with Congo and Tanzania, voted in favour of the Resolution, while China, Russia and Qatar, the only Arab country represented on the UNSC, all abstained, pointing to potential obstacles to its implementation.

Both China and Russia have strong interests in Sudan regarding oil and armaments respectively; and so it was difficult to see how these two countries could put pressure on the Government of Sudan without jeopardizing their relationship. Additionally, China repeated its usual refrain of not interfering in the internal affairs of member states, breaking ranks with the rest of the UNSC and advocating a "softly-softly approach". As will be seen later, the reluctance of these countries to put pressure on Sudan was mirrored on the question of the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President al-Bashir. In fact, China was one of four Security Council members – with Brazil, Algeria, and the United States - that abstained during the adoption of Resolution 1593 (2005) referring Sudan to the ICC.

Qatar's abstention was less surprising, since the League of Arab States (LAS), of which it is a member, had repeatedly voiced its support for the Government of Sudan, including its rejection of the proposed transition from AMIS to UNAMIS. Both the LAS and Government of Sudan either boycotted or sent low-level officials to the final deliberations leading up to Resolution 1706. They questioned the appropriateness of the Resolution. Meanwhile, LAS's refusal to release the Report of its Fact-Finding Mission to Darfur in 2005 raised questions about its willingness to criticize one of its own. LAS's support for the Government of Sudan has been viewed by some as a clear case of 'double standards', on three counts. First and foremost, the vast majority of the victims in Darfur are Muslims. Second, there has been a stark contrast between the usual activism and public manifestations of anger by the LAS and the Arab public over the 'plight' of Muslims, whether in Bosnia, Chechnya, Palestine or Kashmir, and the response to the Darfur crisis, where a deafening silence is all that has been heard. Third, the absence of financial and humanitarian support for the AU peacekeeping mission and the large numbers of internally displaced persons by LAS was a further manifestation of the group's indifference to the crisis.

For his part, President al-Bashir sharply criticized the African members of the UNSC for supporting what his government viewed as a neo-colonial agenda; this, despite the fact that the AU, with the consent of Sudan, was leading peacemaking efforts in Darfur. In playing the neo-colonial card, President al-Bashir was hoping to win the sympathy of AU members, but this discourse failed to resonate with the vast majority of members.

The Impact of al-Bashir Indictment by the ICC on AAU's m\Mission in Darfur
The warrant of arrest issued for President al-Bashir by the ICC on 4 March 2009, added another complex layer to the crisis, threatening to overshadow not only efforts to deploy the hybrid AU-UN force, UNAMIS – a process that has been painfully slow – but to erode progress in terms of the implementation of the CPA. There were also concerns that differences between the UNSC and the PSC over the indictment could complicate their evolving partnership with negative consequences for the faltering peace process in Darfur. The decision split the two Councils, as the PSC made repeated requests to the UNSC to suspend the warrant by invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute. To their surprise, their requests failed to elicit a positive response from the UNSC.

Three Permanent Members of the Security Council - the UK, U.S. and France - insisted that the ICC process should be allowed to run its course. For the most part, the trio maintained their support for the indictment, despite the ambivalence of President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who in several moments offered to support a suspension of the indictment if Sudan agreed to meet certain conditions, including full cooperation with UNAMIS. These offers however, elapsed but had the unintended effect of widening the rift between the two Councils because the PSC felt that the UNSC might have considered France's request for a suspension based on the usual *quid-pro-quo,* which operates among the five permanent members of the UNSC, having conspicuously ignored its own requests.

The U.S., though not a state party to the ICC, under both President Bush and President Obama supported the indictment. However, China and Russia, the other two Permanent Members of the UNSC, expressed doubts about the efficacy of the move arguing that the Government of Sudan should be given time to deal with what both countries perceived as a domestic affair. But despite their objections neither offered to champion the AU's call for a suspension of the indictment.

Although the AU did not object to the indictment per se, it expressed concern at the poor timing which, in its view, could exacerbate the Darfur crisis; this, despite two African members of the Security Council (Benin and Tanzania) voting in support of the referral in 2005. The third AU member on the UNSC, Algeria, abstained in the vote on Resolution 1593 (2005), which was adopted with 11 votes and 4 abstentions). The AU was also concerned that the timing would complicate peacemaking efforts in Darfur and potentially undermine the CPA and expressed fears about the safety of UNAMIS personnel, the bulk of whom are Africans.

The Establishment of AU High-Level Panel on Darfur
The establishment of an independent High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) by the PSC following the issue of the arrest warrant for President Bashir was perhaps the most practical step the AU took in facing up to the dilemma. The Panel, consisting of eminent Africans, was mandated to "examine the situation in depth and submit recommendations to the Council on how best the issues of accountability and combating impunity on the one hand, and reconciliation and healing on the other, could be effectively and comprehensively addressed" (Ogunbayo, 2009).

The panel was established against the backdrop of a growing concern among African leaders of what they perceive as the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction. These concerns were described by a 2008 AU summit as 'a development that could endanger international law, order and security' pointing to what the summit viewed as the political nature of legal proceedings initiated by non-African judges, most notably from France and Spain, against officials in the current government of Rwanda, including President Paul Kagame (*Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, DOC.EX.CL/411 (XIII), 3 July 2008*).

The Panel marked an important step in the AU's response to the ICC decision and the need to strike an appropriate balance between dealing with impunity and promoting peace and reconciliation. The AU was faced with the challenge of treading the fine line between upholding its principles on the one hand, and promoting peace and reconciliation on the other. The UN had plugged the gap in the absence of an AU framework and/or capacity to bring the perpetrators of such crimes to justice through ad hoc institutions such as the

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Based on the foregoing, the AU was reluctant to cooperate with the ICC on this account.

The AU's decision not to cooperate with the ICC came as little surprise given the support of AU Chairperson and then Libyan President, Colonel Muammar Gadaffi, for President al-Bashir and the former's staunch opposition to the ICC. But efforts to present the decision as one based on consensus failed as several states - Botswana, Ghana, Chad and later South Africa - distanced themselves from the decision, promising to abide by their treaty obligations. Thus, the AU's decision not cooperate with the ICC was directed at the UNSC for being unresponsive to its request, with the ICC being the immediate casualty of the failed dialogue between the two organizations.

The Arab Response
Unsurprisingly, Arab members of the AU and the LAS were unanimous in rejecting the ICC decision. Like the AU, the LAS called on the UNSC to suspend and even drop the indictment. Driven by different interests and motivations, the AU and the LAS found common ground in their opposition to the ICC decision. While the position of the AU is somewhat surprising, the same cannot be said of the LAS, which had backed the Government of Sudan even in the face of evidence of war crimes in Darfur. LAS member states including Qatar, Algeria, and Libya either openly supported President al-Bashir or at best abstained during voting at the UNSC. This seriously compromised any impartial peacemaking role that the LAS or its individual members could play in the future. The involvement of any of these states would require a great deal of confidence-building with the armed groups in Darfur. Lacking any feasible operational role given its internal dysfunctions, the LAS could have exerted more political leverage on the Government of Sudan than any other organization, including the AU.

But the opportunity was squandered. That the LAS provided minimal financial and humanitarian support to AMIS and the internally displaced in Darfur was another manifestation of its indifference to the plight of civilians caught in the crisis. In fact, Canada alone provided more financial and logistical support to AMIS than the 22 members of LAS put together (Mackie et.al, 2006). This, at a time, when some members of LAS, most notably Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, were reaping the benefits of the oil bonanza, something that has raised a lot of troubling questions. The question on everybody's lips, but which few dare to ask openly, is whether the fact that the victims in Darfur are black Africans - albeit predominantly Muslim - shaped the position of Arab states and Arab public opinion? Weighed against LAS's consistent condemnation of the suffering of Muslims elsewhere in the world, the answer is somewhat obvious. LAS's open support for the Government of Sudan, repeating ad nauseam al-Bashir's position that the conflict is nothing more than a tribal war between pastoral tribes demonstrated its bias as it contributed to distorting the real causes of the conflict. Indeed Libyan President, Colonel Gadaffi, went so far as to describe the conflict as a "quarrel over a camel" (BBC News, 2007).

THE AU AND ALTERNATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM
Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Africa
In a well-researched work by Castro & Ettenger (1996), it has been demonstrated that regional institutions like the AU can leverage on indigenous knowledge of the histories of groups in conflict to manage and resolve conflict situations. Here, "indigenous knowledge" is portrayed as a repertoire of ideas and actions from which community members, faced with

specific problems, can draw upon, depending on their level of knowledge, their preferences, and their ability and motivation to act to resolve their differences. Thus, it involves improvisation and flexibility in response to ongoing conditions. Dispute processing is similarly characterized as a repertoire of processes, which communities and their members respond to dynamically and differentially.

The argument here is that social groups often, not only have their own customary legal orders, but also have access to state or other legal systems. While communities may be able to appeal to different legal orders, not all people have equal access to all options. In general, all legal orders rely, to varying extents, on the same basic procedural modes to handle disputes: avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. In their work, Castro & Ettenger (1996), presented four case studies to show that social groups can explore indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms to sort out their differences rather than depending on what others suggest or imposed on them.

History indicates that Africa has the highest rate of violent conflicts in the world (Nwadike & Ekeanyanwu, 2012). These conflicts range from land/border disputes, resource control, ethnic cleavages to wars of liberation, to mention a few. Moreover, Africa's conflict theatre seems to have taken a new dimension since the end of the Cold War, with independence struggles, ethno-religious conflicts, and intra/inter-state wars taking the centre stage. For example, during the four decades between the 1960s and the 1990s, there have been about 80 violent changes of governments in the 48 sub-Saharan African countries (Bujra, 2002). Beginning with the Sudanese conflict, countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Nigeria and Eritrea took centre stages from the 1960s to 1970s. Although there were restoration of peace in majority of them, other countries including Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Uganda experienced a reversion from the 1980s with new ones such as Chad and Liberia, and worsened in the 1990s in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Cameroun, Somalia, Burundi, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire (Bello & Olutola, 2016).

Almost one third of the world's genocides between 1960 and 1988 (eleven of thirty-five) took place in Africa (Harff & Gurr, 1988). Consolidating the statistics, Uppsala survey argued that the period between 1990 and 2002 witnessed the intensification of wars and armed conflicts in Africa. As of February 2008, there were only five active wars ongoing in the continent; Sudan (Darfur region), Kenya (post-election violence between December 2007 and February 2008), Somalia (excluding Somaliland), DR Congo (eastern region) and Chad. Between 2010 and 2013, there were armed conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Equatorial Guinea and Central African Republic with awful consequences, generating intervention at the regional, extra-regional and international levels. These variables and indicators portend one thing: to present Africa as a continent of deep horror, with people who cannot live peaceably among themselves and ungovernable (Nwadike & Ekeanyanwu, 2012).

Unfortunately however, the dilemma confronting Africa today is not really the occurrence of the conflict in the real sense, but how to resolve them in such a manner as to prevent the past ones from re-occurring and also contain the present ones from escalating and degenerating into full-scale wars. Since conflict is path of human interaction, the choice of right methods/instruments, appropriate techniques and suitable strategies for its resolution in Africa is one issue of concern to various stakeholders. Besides, most of the numerous conflict resolution strategies adopted were of western configurations, thus excluding the indigenous

mechanisms. Unfortunately, Africa's indigenous methods of conflict resolution have recorded tremendous results for decades, even in post-Cold War era. What are these methods? How effective are they? Can they be deployed in today's conflict theatre? Who are the actors? In this section, we have examined two major indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution in Africa, namely: the Mato-Oput of northern Uganda; and the Gacaca court system of Rwanda.

Conflict Resolution in Africa

There is no gainsaying the fact that conflict resolution aims to address causes of conflict and seeks to build new relationships by helping parties to a conflict to explore, analyze, question and reframe their positions and interests. Resolution helps in alleviating, eliminating or transforming actual and potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes for social development, human safety and political change. Conflict resolution helps in moving contending parties from the destructive patterns of zero-sum conflict to positive (win-win) constructive outcomes (Miall, 2004).

Conflict resolution, therefore, becomes a process that leads the action-system to a state where the conditions of conflict are no longer present; the system must no longer have two or more incompatible goal-states (Galtung, 1965). Within this context, solutions to such conflicts must be mutually acceptable, self-perpetuating and sustaining to all parties concerned because deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, behaviours are changed towards non violence, attitudes are no longer hostile, and structures are no longer exploitative (Klare, 2001). Based on the foregoing, Africa has tried to resolve its numerous conflicts by extensively relying on prescriptions from the Western powers, many of who colonized Africa in the past. It is on this standpoint that several actors engage in Africa's conflict resolution design (Midodzi & Jaha 2011). Starting with the nation-state, in which local and national initiatives are employed as the first level of response to conflict before other external interventions follow such as sub-regional bodies or continental bodies such as African Union and other international frameworks such as the European Union United Nations.

These organizations have been at the centre stage of conflict management and resolution globally, working through the Security Council, General Assembly or special representatives (Clapham 2001). The UN Charter explains the various means of resolving conflicts negotiation, third party intervention, mediation, arbitration, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement. A common trend in the above-mentioned strategies of conflict resolution is their top-down approach to resolving conflict in Africa. The western-oriented systems imposed on African people are often framed in the context of the 'liberal peace project.' To Sorbo & Vale (1997), they were produced in the context of international peace, security and cooperation at the end of the Cold War and therefore, focus exclusively on how members of the international community come to make, create and keep peace on the continent. It not only hides the contributions that traditional conflict management systems in Africa can make towards ensuring peace but sometimes perpetuates conflict situations (Albert, 2007).

African Indigenous Models of Conflict Resolution
The Gacaca System in Rwanda
This indigenous system of conflict resolution in Rwanda dates back to the 17th century. In this system, the king is seen as the link between the temporal and spiritual worlds. He is the highest arbitrator in the land; while the guardian of the tradition, also known as *abiru* helped in administering justice. There is also the village head or the *Inzu* who superintends the

ancestral cult, arranged marriages, and controlled the collective title on land or cattle, among others.

The uniqueness of the system is in the fact that societal problems are first addressed by the *Inzu*, which is the lowest unit of the Rwanda society in historical epoch. This practice became what is referred to as the *gacaca* gatherings. The word *gacaca* means 'justice on the grasses'. The rationale behind the gathering however was the restoration of social harmony, the establishment of truth about an incidence, and the punishment of the perpetrator, or even compensation through a gift (Werchick, 2003). However, colonialism suppressed this traditional system with the introduction of Western legal system, but the *gacaca* system was still maintained as a conflict resolution mechanism at the grassroots level (Reynljens 1990). In responding to the genocidal war at the international level, the UN Security Council Resolution 955 established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute individuals responsible for crimes of genocide and other violation of international law in order to ensure that these kinds of gross violation of human rights would not go unpunished. Unfortunately, the relation between the ICTR and the Rwandan government has always been difficult, mostly because of the possibility that the tribunal might also investigate war crimes committed by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) soldiers and their commanders. Hence, on Rwandan soil, the ICTR is portrayed and perceived an instance of the Western way of doing justice - highly inefficient, time consuming, expensive and not adapted to Rwandan custom.

The Rwandan Government established the Gacaca Law to indigenous courts with a mandate to try crime cases committed during the genocide. Gacaca is an indigenous mechanism of conflict resolution that was originally practiced among the Banyarwanda, who use it to resolve dispute at the grassroots level through dialogue and a community justice system. It is an intricate process based on custom, tradition, and social norms. Truth telling is the fundamental principle of the gacaca system. The validity of evidence is cross-referenced or cross-examined by a number of witnesses in the community who can attest to alleged atrocity committed.

The Mato-Oput in Northern Uganada

This system of traditional conflict resolution is dominant among the Acholi people of northern Uganda and it is hinged on the understanding of conflict as a devastating phenomenon (Wasonga 2009). The Acholi people place the interest of the community first, and above their individual and group interests. Their allegiances are also reflected in the celebration of life and belief in their ancestral spirit, otherwise referred to as *jok* who guide their moral standing. As it is practiced, when a wrong is committed, the ancestor sends *cen*, the spirit of the dead person in the form of misfortune, unless the elders and the offender take appropriate action to restore the broken relationship. This phenomenon of *cen* illustrates the centrality of relationships between the natural and the supernatural world in Acholi, the living and the dead, and the normative continuity between an individual and the community (Wasonga 2009).

The traditional Acholi society has no formal or informal courts of law, so judgement depends upon the truth and a readiness to accept responsibility for one's actions. These Acholi principles are embodied in the practice of mato-oput. The word 'mato' means 'drinking' and "oput" is a type of tree with bitter herb. Hence, Mato-Oput literally means 'drinking of bitter herb,' made from the leaves of the *oput* tree. The drinking of the bitter herbs symbolically means that the two conflicting parties accept the bitterness of the past and promise never to

taste such bitterness again (Wasonga 2009). Mato-Oput is an indigenous approach to justice and the re-integration of offenders which involves mediation of truth, accountability and reconciliation through certain symbolic acts and spiritual appeasement (Wasonga, 2009). This principle emphasizes the necessity of harmonious living and the restoration of social order in the society, especially after a typically long process of mediation between the two conflicting parties and only when the offender is willing to take responsibility. A cleansing ceremony or process is carried out especially in murder cases (which is a major breakdown of communal social fabrics). It is to appease the spirit of the dead in order to prevent being haunted by the spirit of the deceased.

The Judiyya System in Sudan
The existence of the judiyya traditional system of conflict resolution in Sudan and especially in the tribal communities of Darfur is a confirmation that African traditional system of conflict resolution was effective before the intrusion of colonialism. Wahab (2018), has noted that the judiyya system has been effectively practiced for centuries in Darfur before colonial contact. According to him, that system was relevant in maintaining peace and security among the various tribes in the region and entire Sudan; and still relevant today only if the AU would review and adopt it as a mechanism for resolving the Darfur crisis.

The judiyya traditional system is deeply-rooted in the culture of the Sudanese people; and modelled after the Council of Elders as we see in the Igbo system or Pokot system in Kenya. In this system, the elders, called *ajaweed* play significant roles in managing conflicts and resolving disputes. These elders are usually drawn from all the tribes. In their task of managing conflicts, these elders draw on their wisdom and life experiences to forestall conflicts and build peace. These elders are regarded as custodians of knowledge of the various tribes, the living versions of the spirit of the tribes and accurate keepers of centuries of histories passed down to them by their forebears. Among the people of Sudan, particularly the Darfur, the judiyya is seen as a veritable social institution for conflict resolution. The local tribes, nomadic herdsmen and farmers relied on the judiyya process for reconciliation, ensuring peaceful and harmonious relations; and a mechanism for sharing, distributing and managing scarce natural resources. This traditional mechanism has been described as restorative and conciliatory in nature. According to Flint (2010), the major emphasis of judiyya is anchored on "restitution and compensation for harm, to revise damaged relationships, to ensure the full integration of the parties into their tribal community again and resume the collaboration for the well-being of the group".

In the event of dispute, some members of the *aljaweed* are called upon to mediate in the dispute to ensure that such dispute does not escalate into violence. These elders are well-versed in the communal mores, customs and traditions; and they command immense respect among their people. Given the social character of the people, which is defined by their religion, members of the *aljaweed* are always men since the influence of women is limited to the home-front. Since the late 19th century, judiyya was the major institution that regulated land and grazing rights between the tribal communities, especially in the western part of Sudan. The region is part of Africa's sub-Sahara, where ecological degradation is now widespread and one of the aggravating causes of violence in that region. The focus on the use of the Judiyya to resolve the conflict over scarce resources does not mean that other communal disputes are rarely resolved through Judiyya. Rather, it highlights the general applicability of the model to deal with all disputes on a communal level. In Darfur, the management of scarce resources is thus a daily affair that forms part of the everyday

management of pastoral affairs. This perhaps explains the relationship between the issues on the communal level.

Summary of Findings

This study has examined the African Union (AU) and conflict resolution in Africa with particular emphasis on the Darfur conflict in South Sudan. There is no doubt that the Darfur crisis has immensely tested the African Union's resolve to keep peace and stop the excruciating destruction of human life on the continent. This study argues that the nature and pattern of AU's response to the Darfur crisis has been hampered by many factors including the duplicity of the Arab states, lack of cooperation from the Government of Sudan and pressures from international partners. To that extent, the AU has done its best within the context it had to work. Secondly, the study is of the view that the AU has relied so much on external prescriptions for conflict resolution on the continent in total default to existing African traditional conflict mechanisms, which it can leverage on to resolve conflicts on the continent. The findings from our discussion thus far can be itemized as follows:

a) The recourse by the AU in implementing external prescriptions as response to conflicts in Africa has not been effective.

b) The AU has ignored African traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in developing strategies for containing conflicts in Africa especially in Darfur. African traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been employed with positive outcomes in so many African societies like the Igbo and Yoruba of Nigeria, the Pokot and Turkana in Kenya, among the Rwanda people, the Acholi tribe of northern Uganda and even among the Darfur people of Sudan.

Recommendations

In view of the foregoing, we make the following recommendations:

1. The AU should ensure that any of its conflict resolution initiatives should be fashioned in such a way that they are owned by the indigenous people. This will make such initiatives more effective and ensure positive outcome. AU should also ensure that when it leads a peace process that it enjoys the support of its members and that of the wider international community; ensure that the negotiating parties have a strong sense of ownership of the process, as this increases compliance and cooperation in implementing subsequent peace agreements; harmonize its initiatives on issues of transitional justice and be guided by the overarching desire to enhance human security which is at the core of its founding charter, the Constitutive Act.

2. The AU should consider the adoption of African traditional conflict resolution Mechanisms: Since the Western prescription, despite their laudable intentions have always resulted in conflict relapse, African leaders are hereby advised to look inwards and embrace African indigenous models in tackling conflicts on the continent. The AU should, therefore, focus on the indigenous models owing to their uniqueness and effectiveness. The judiyya system, which had worked so well in Darfur should be revived, reviewed and implemented in Darfur.

Conclusion

The Darfur crisis has been a test case for the capacity of the AU to resolve conflicts on the continent considering the huge international outcry, which the conflict in the area has elicited. The Darfur conflict has become almost intractable essentially because of the complexities attending it. The current peace efforts are commendable regardless of the challenges and expectations of how it could have been done. However, since most African conflicts take

place in a particular context and milieu, it is therefore logical and imperative for African conflict resolution actors to turn inward, discover and embrace African indigenous models like the ones that we have briefly discussed above in tackling incessant conflicts that are ravaging the continent. The AU should also adopt and deploy these indigenous methods into its conflict resolution mechanisms, especially where the Western models are not yielding the desired result. Focus should therefore be on the indigenous models owing to their uniqueness and effectiveness.

References

Albert, O. I (2008). "Understanding peace in Africa", In David J. Francis (ed.), Peace and conflict in Africa. London: Zed Books

Adogamhe G. Paul (2008). "Pan-Africanism Revisited. Vision and Reality of African Unity and Development", *Journal of African Review of Integration* Vol.2 No. 2 July, p.2

Ahmad, S., (2009). "The World's worst Humanitarian Crisis: Understanding the Darfur Conflict". *Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspectives,* 2(5)

African Union, (2000). Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July.

African Union, (2002). Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 9 July. Available at <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20 and%20security.pdf>

Asogwa, F.C., (2013). "The African Union (AU), New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and Regional Integration in Africa in a Multi-polar World". *Paper presented at the 5th European Conference of African Studies, African Institute*, Lisbon University, Portugal, 27th-29th June

Bah, A.S., (2010). "The African Union in Darfur: Understanding the Afro-Arab Response to the Crisis", in The Gap between Narratives and Practices- Darfur: The Responses from the Arab World. *FRIDE*: *A European Think-Tank for Global Action*. October-March

BBC News, (2007). "Mumar Gadaffi- Darfur: Quarrel Over a Camel," 23 October, 2007. Accessible at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7058671.stm. Accessed 30/04/09.

Bello, P.O., & Olutola, A.A. (2016). "Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Africa: Lessons Drawn for Nigeria". *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*. 13(2), pp.70-88

Best, S.G. (2005). Introduction to peace and conflict studies in West Africa – A Reader (Ed.). Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

Brewer, M.B, (2010). "Intergroup Relations." In: Roy F. Baumeister and Eli J. Finkel (Eds.), Advanced Social Psychology: The State of Science. London: Oxford University Press

Burton, J.W. (1990). Conflict Resolution and Prevention. London: McMillan Publishers.

Bujra, A. (2002). "African conflicts: Their causes and their political and social Environment".

Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF): *Occasional Paper*, 4

Castro, A.P., & Ettenger, K. (1996). "Indigenous Knowledge and Conflict Management: Exploring Local Perspectives and Mechanisms for dealing with Community Forestry Disputes". *Paper Prepared for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Community Forestry Unit, for the Global Electronic Conference on "Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Through Community Forestry," January-April*

Cobham, A. (2005). "Causes of conflict in Sudan: Testing the Black Book", *European Journal of Development Research,* 17(3), pp. 462–480.

Cuhadar, E., & Dayton, B. (2011). "The Social Psychology of Identity and Inter-group Conflict: From Theory to Practice". *International Studies Perspectives*, 12, pp.273–293.

Cervanka, Z. (1977). The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU. London: Friedman Publishers

Clapham C. (2001). "Regional integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International Perspective". Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs in Collaboration with the Nordic Council of Ministry and the British High Commission in Pretoria.

Cornelius, H. & Faire, S. (1989) Everyone can Win: How to Resolve Conflict. Australia: Simon & Schuster

de Waal, A. (2007). War in Darfur and the Search for Peace. Harvard: Harvard University Press

Francis, D. J., (2005). Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems. Burlington: Ashgate.

Francis, D. J. (2008). Introduction: Understanding the context of peace and conflict in Africa, in David J. Francis, (ed.), Peace and Conflict in Africa. London: Zed Books

Forsyth, D.R., (2009). Group Dynamics (5th Ed.). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

Gurr, T. R. (1991). "Theories of political violence and revolution in the third world", in Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman, (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.

Galtung, J. (1965). "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm". *Journal of Peace Research*, 2(4), pp.348-397

Harff, B. & Gurr, T. R. (1988). "Toward an empirical theory of genocides and Politicides: Identification and measurement of cases since 1945". *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(3), pp. 359-371.

Harvard Law School, (2020). "What is Conflict Resolution and How Does It Work? Accessible at: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/conflict-resolution/what-is-conflict-resolution-and-how-does-it-work/

Hurst, R. (2009). "Mahdist Revolution (1881-1898)". *Blackpast* accessible at https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/mahdist-revolution-1881-1898/

Human Rights Watch, (2006). "Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan". *Human Rights Watch,* 18(1A)

Hoile, D., (2005). Darfur in Perspective. London: European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council

Kador, M. (2007). New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Globalized Era. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Kennes, D. T. (2007). Africa's Regional Integration Arrangements: History and Challenges. Maastricht: *ECDPM Discussion Paper*, No. 74

Legum, C., (1975). "The Organization of African Unity: Success or Failure?" *International Affairs*, 51(2), pp. 208-219

Mayer, B., (2012). The Dynamics of Conflict: A Guide to Engagement and Intervention (2nd Ed.). San Francisco, California: Jossey-Bass.

Meredith, M. (1984). The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Post-War Era. London: Hamish Hamilton

Miall, H & Wood house, T. (2001). Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention Management and Transformation of deadly Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Murithi, T. (2005). The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development. Burlington: Ashgate.

Mitchell, C. & Banks, M. (Eds.) (1996). Handbook on Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem Solving Approach. New York: Pinter Press

Midodzi, P & Jaha, I. (2011). "Assessing the effectiveness of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism in the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict in the Volta region of Ghana". *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies*. 2(7). Available at http://www.academicjournals.org/IJPDS

Nwadike, F. & Ekeanyanwu, N. (2012). "Building sustainable peace in Africa: Nigeria in Perspective". *African Media and Democracy Journal*, 1(1). Available at: http://www.amdcjournal.net

Nwankwo, A.A. (1989). Before I Die: Obasanjo-Arthur Nwankwo Correspondence on the One-party State. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.

Oguonu, C.N & Ezeibe, C.C., (2014). "African Union and Conflict Resolution in Africa". *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(27), pp. 325-332

Oluwaniyi, O. (2011) "Post Amnesty programme in the Niger-Delta: Challenges and Prospects". *Conflict Trends*, 4, ACCORD

Ogunbayo, M. (2009). "Moment of Reckoning for Al-Bashir," *Newswatch*, March Accessible at *http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=697&Itemid=41*

Roberts, A. & Ash, T. G., (2009). Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Rapoport, A. (1989). The origins of violence: Approaches to the study of conflict. New York, NY: Paragon House.

Rapoport, A. (1992). Peace: An idea whose time has come. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Sandole, D.J.D. & van de Merwe, H. (1993) Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Salim, A. S. (2001). "Towards the African Union", *DPMN Bulletin*, August, pp. 10-14

Schalk, T.J. (2005). The Role of the Organization of African Unity as an International Governmental Organization in Regional Cooperation and Stability (1963-2000). Unpublished DPA Thesis. Pretoria: University of South Africa

Udezo, B., (2009). "Concepts and Methods of Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building: Imperatives for Religious Leaders in Nigeria". *Journal of Religion and Human Relations,* 1.

Zweifel, T., (2006). International Organizations and Democracy: Accountability, Politics, and Power. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.